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Abstract
I study the optimal regulation of a rm producing two goods. The rm has private in-
formation about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the
optimal allocation di¤ers from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints
in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most e¢ cient producers and
features overproduction for some less e¢ cient types.
JEL: D82, L21, Asymmetric Information, Multi-dimensional Screening, Regulation.
1 Introduction
When duplication of xed costs is wasteful, a service is e¢ ciently provided by a natural monopoly.
To keep the service provider from abusing its monopoly power, the pricing of the rm is regulated.
If the regulator knew what the rm knows, then optimal regulation would simply entail pricing at
marginal costs and reimbursing the rm for the losses it makes on a lump-sum basis. However,
typically rms are better informed about cost and/or demand conditions than the regulator is.
This problem was rst addressed by Loeb and Magat [1979] and studied rigourously using the
tools of mechanism design by Baron and Myerson [1982] and Sappington [1983]. If cost conditions
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are known to the rm but not to the regulator, then marginal cost pricing is no longer optimal.
Marginal cost pricing gives rms with relatively low marginal costs incentives to exaggerate their
costs in order to get larger subsidies. To make such exaggeration unattractive, prices are distorted
upwards for all but the most e¢ cient rms.
Much of our theoretical understanding of the regulation problem is built around one-dimensional
models where the rms informational advantage is captured by the realization of either a cost or
a demand shifter. This paper wishes to shed light on the the optimal pricing of a rm that knows
several parameters that escape the regulator. This is a natural and important problem. Firms
typically produce multiple goods; e.g. a railway company can transport cargo and passengers, a
telephone company can use its wires to transmit voice and data, water utilities deliver fresh water
and provide sewerage services. Moreover, serving di¤erent customer groups that are di¤erentiated
either by usertype (household versus non-household) or geographical location may be viewed as
supplying di¤erent goods. It is analytically convenient but otherwise rather special to assume that
the rms cost conditions along the various dimensions of production are perfectly correlated -
which is essentially what we do if we assume that the cost shifter is a one-dimensional parameter.
The minimal complexity needed to address this question in some generality is a model featuring
two dimensions of production and two dimensions of asymmetric information. Moreover, the nat-
ural extension of one-dimensional models with a continuum of types as, e.g., in Baron and Myerson
[1982] is to assume that types are drawn from a rectangle. Rochet and Choné [1998] analyze such
a model and show that two properties are robust in the multidimensional problem. Firstly, con-
rming Armstrong [1996], a fraction of types is excluded at the optimum. Secondly, the optimal
contractual arrangement displays bunching at the low end of the type support. Unfortunately,
these two properties make the problem so hard to analyze that it basically becomes impossible to
gain any further insights. The known alternative models that are more accessible, surveyed below,
are based on reducing the dimension of the design problem back to one dimension. This paper
proposes an alternative to this approach where the design problem remains two-dimensional and
yet the problem remains tractable. Essentially, the idea is to identify assumptions that make the
second best amount of production in one dimension easy to characterize. Once this part of the
allocation is known, the solution to the remainder of the allocation problem can be characterized
in closed form as well.
Armstrong and Rochet [1999] solve the regulation problem in a two-by-two model, that is, in
a model of a rm producing two goods and knowing the realization of two cost parameters on
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binary supports. In the present paper, I extend their analysis to the case where one parameter is
drawn from a continuum while the other parameter still has a binary support. The regulated rm
produces two goods - say, fresh water and severage services - and privately observes two parameters
shifting its cost of production. The rst parameter, drawn from a continuum, a¤ects the marginal
cost of producing good one - fresh water - only. The second parameter, drawn from a binary
distribution, a¤ects the marginal cost of producing good two - the severage service - only. In
addition, the marginal costs of producing each of the goods are allowed to depend on the amount
of the other good. The crucial assumption that makes the model tractable is that the di¤erence
between the realizations of the binary parameter are relatively large. Under this assumption, the
second best allocation features a good two allocation that depends only on the realization of the
binary parameter. As a result, the population of rms is essentially split into two groups according
to the amount of good two they produce. Within these groups, rms face the same incentives as
rms in the Baron Myerson [1982] model do. However, in addition, rms can also mimic rms in
the other group by producing a di¤erent amount of good two. Consequently, the pricing of good
one needs to be adjusted so as to keep rms from engaging in such behaviour.
The model is designed to understand one of the various e¤ects in the multidimensional problem
in detail. In particular, the model sheds light on how the additional information through the
observed amount of good two feeds back into the pricing of good one. The model is both stylized
and rich. It is stylized in that I obtain a complete solution as a function of the models primitives.
It is rich because it allows for a large but manageable variety of optimal allocations and o¤ers
clearcut predictions as to what primitives give rise to which allocation.
The optimal allocation depends crucially on two factors. Firstly, the nature of interaction
between the two goods in the social surplus function and secondly, the statistical dependence
between the cost parameters. Each of these factors can make it unattractive for a rm to signal its
binary type through the amount of good two it produces. For concreteness, suppose that the cost
parameters are statistically independent but assume that the goods are net substitutes in the sense
of La¤ont and Tirole [1993]. Then, consuming a larger amount of good two makes it desirable to
consume a smaller amount of good one. Since the rms rents arising from good one production
are related to the quantity of good one the rm can sell, all else equal, rms nd it particularly
attractive to produce the smaller amount of good two. Statistical dependence can have a similar
e¤ect: in equilibrium, the amount of good two indicates the rms cost of producing good two
which in turn provides information about its cost of producing good one. If costs are positively
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correlated, then the regulator becomes relatively more concerned with extracting rents from the
rm that produces the larger amount of good two and hence sets prices such that this rm produces
a smaller amount of good one. In both cases, the rms that are e¢ cient at producing good two
need to be given an explicit incentive to produce the large amount of good two and the optimal
allocation reects this constraint being binding.
The optimal allocation is strikingly di¤erent in the case of surplus interactions and the case of
purely statistical interaction. In the case of pure surplus interactions it is optimal to set marginal
prices for good one below marginal costs for all but the most ine¢ cient rm supplying a large
amount of good two. In contrast, good one prices for rms producing the smaller amount of good
two are set above marginal cost, over and above the level that would be optimal if only one quantity
of good two could be produced to begin with. Moreover, I provide conditions making it optimal to
leave unusually large rents to all rms that produce the larger amount of good two, including the
most ine¢ cient producer within that group. Finally, this allocation features complete separation
between all types.
In the case of purely statistical interaction, it is optimal to set the marginal price of good one
independently of what amount of good two is produced; in other words, in this case the good one
allocation features bunching in the parameter relating to production costs of good two. Moreover,
it is never optimal to leave any rents to the ine¢ cient rms in both groups.
Among the qualitative features of the solution, presumably the most interesting nding is the
pricing below marginal costs. As documented by Sawkins and Reid [2007], there is evidence of
some prices below marginal cost in the Scottish Water industry, so this does not seem to be a mere
theoretical curiosity but rather something worth understanding. There are various explanations
for such observations. It is well known that a multiproduct monopolist may nd it optimal to set
some prices below marginal costs (see Tirole [1988]) in order to stimulate the demand for some
of its other products. This exlanation crucially relies on demand complementarities. The present
approach o¤ers an explanation that relies exclusively on incentive concerns, so the model can
rationalize prices below marginal costs even in the absence of demand complementarities.
Results closest in the literature are Armstrong and Rochet [1999], Lewis and Sappington [1988]
and Armstrong [1999]. All three of these papers discuss prices below marginal costs. In particular,
Armstrong and Rochet [1999] show that prices below marginal costs arise at the optimum under
particular conditions. As explained above, the present model enriches the one by Armstrong and
Rochet [1999] towards a more general yet still tractable version of the two-dimensional problem.
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Hence, by intention, the main contribution of this paper is to identify the e¤ects that survive in the
richer context. Since the solution techniques remain manageable, there are reasons to hope that
the present results can be extended to even richer models, bridging the gap between the two-by-two
and the continuum-by-continuum model even further.1
Lewis and Sappington [1988] and Armstrong [1999] also note the possibility of prices below
marginal costs, even though in quite di¤erent models. In their approaches, there are two parameters
of private information - marginal costs and the level of demand - but the regulator has only one
instrument, the marginal price, to screen rms. As a result, the dimensionality of the design
problem is reduced to one, making the problem amenable to techniques developed by La¤ont,
Maskin and Rochet [1987] and McAfee and McMillan [1988]. While there is bunching by design
in these models, there are as many parameters of private information as screening instruments in
the present paper and so the design problem remains two-dimensional2 . While both Lewis and
Sappington [1988] and Armstrong [1999] note the possibility that prices can be set below marginal
costs, Armstrong [1999] proves the optimality of exclusion in the Lewis and Sappington model,
due to, essentially the same reasons as in Armstrong [1996]. One reason why the present approach
remains tractable is that exclusion, as in Armstrong [1996, 1999], does not occur here. As a result,
I am able to turn the possibility result into a denite taxonomy of model primitives3 , and delineate
the precise circumstances which feature marginal prices below marginal costs. It is left for future
work - some of which is described in the nal section - to see whether the qualitative features of
the optimal allocation survive in even richer contexts.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section two I lay out the model and explain the regu-
1Formally, the reason the present model remains manageable is that double-deviations - simultaneous lies in both
dimensions - can be handled. While such double-deviations can be analyzed explicitly in the two-by-two model, they
are the reason why the multidimensional problem with a richer type space is hardly tractable. Another approach
that overcomes the double-deviation issue di¤erently is Kleven et al. (2009) in the context of the taxation of couples.
The optimal mechanism in the present context is very di¤erent from theirs. See also Beaudry et al. [2009] for yet
a di¤erent approach where double-deviations are not optimal. In contrast to Beaudry et al. [2009] the present
approach makes no restrictions on the available deviation strategies.
2See also Rochet and Stole [2003] for an overview of di¤erent approaches to multidimensional screening problems
in the literature.
3Formally, exclusion does not occur since the type space in the current model is binarycontinnum, while
Armstrong [1996, 1999] assumes a continuumcontinuum type space.
4A main di¢ culty with richer models is the techniques required to solve the models; see Rochet and Stole [2003]
for an overview. However, a further di¢ culty arises from the ignorance of what one is actually looking for. Since it
usually becomes much easier to prove the optimality of an allocation once it is known how it looks like, I hope the
current results prove to be a useful guide in the search of solutions to richer models.
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lators allocation choice and its solution in the rst-best. In Section three, I describe the set of
implementable allocations and derive the regulators control problem. In Section four, I lay out
a benchmark case where constraints are binding in only one dimension. In Section ve, I treat
the multidimensional problem and discuss how binding constraints relate to bunching. Section six
contains closed form solutions for the case of a fully separating solution (with binding constraints
in both dimensions) and the case of full separation in one dimension and complete bunching along
the other dimension. Section seven discusses extensions and o¤ers some conclusions. Long proofs
have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model and the main assumptions
There are two goods. Consumersvaluations for these two goods are given by the function V (x; q) ;
where x is the quantity of the rst good and q the quantity of the second good. Consumers
valuation for good one is independent5 of the valuation for good two, so V (x; q) = V 1 (x)+V 2 (q).
Good one is perfectly divisible and consumers decide how much to consume. Letting P 1 (x) denote
the inverse demand function for good one, I have
V 1 (x) 
xZ
0
P 1 (z) dz:
I assume that the inverse demand function is di¤erentiable and decreasing in x; so the valuation is
twice di¤erentiable and concave. Obviously, the valuation is increasing in x: V 1x (0) is su¢ ciently
large to make all solutions interior: Good two can be produced in discrete quantities, or more
generally variants, q 2 fq0  0; q1; q2;    ; qng ; where qi > qi 1 for i = 1; : : : ; n: V 2 (q) is increasing
with q; V 2 (0) = 0, and V
2(qi) V 2(qi 1)
qi qi 1 is decreasing in i: Given the discreteness of the good two
allocation problem, there is a range of prices that induces consumers to consume qi units of good
two, if that is the desired amount. Assuming q0 = 0 is a normalization that has two interpretations.
Variant q0 can be understood as shutting down the second dimension, that is, consuming zero units
of that good; or it can be understood as a baseline version whose costs are known to the regulator.
The normalization is not used until section 4. It is not essential that the variants are discrete.
What matters is that there is a maximum quantity qn:
The goods are produced by a monopoly rm subject to price regulation. The rms cost of
5Assuming independent demands shifts all the interactions into the rms cost function, which allows me to
clearly trace back reasons for binding constraints. The assumption can be relaxed.
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producing the goods in quantities x and q is
C (x; q; ; ) = K + x + q + xq;
where K > 0 and  are constants known to both regulator and rm, and x and q are veriable so
that contracts can be written on these variables;  and  are parameters that are known to the
rm but not to the regulator.  is a parameter that captures the sign and strength of interactions
between good one and good two in the rms cost function.
The regulator knows only the joint distribution of the variables  and ;.these parameters
are distributed on a product set   H with probability density function f (; ) > 0 for all
; : The set  is taken as the interval

; 

, where  >  > 0: The set H is taken as

; 
	
where  >  > 0: The marginal probability that  =  is equal to : Given the full support
assumption, the conditional distribution of  given  has full support. The density and cdf of this
distribution are denoted f ( j ) and F ( j ) ; respectively. Let E denote the expectation operator
and let f ()  EH [f ( j )] and F () denote the density and the cdf of the marginal distribution,
respectively.
The cost function satises the standard Spence-Mirrlees conditions in x, and q; , respectively.
The allocation problem is rich and simple at the same time. It is simple in the sense that the good
two allocation is discrete; this makes the problem solvable. It is rich in the sense that the solution
to the problem di¤ers substantially from the one where good two is absent.
The rm is subject to price regulation. However, it is equivalent and notationally much more
convenient to analyze the model directly in terms of quantity regulation (that is, as a procurement
problem). If the rm produces quantities x and q then it receives a payment t and its prot is
t  C (x; q; ; ) :
The properties of the optimal incentive scheme can be traced back into the context of price regu-
lation using the well known fact that
V 1x (x) = P
1 (x) :
Dene the sum of consumer and producer surplus as
S (x; q; ; )  V 1 (x) + V 2 (q)  C (x; q; ; ) :
Notice that the surplus function is concave in x; moreover, Sx (x; q; ; ) =   ( + q) is non-
increasing in q for   0 and increasing in q for  < 0: In the former case x and q are net
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substitutes in the surplus function while they are net complements in the latter case6 .
2.1 The regulators problem
By the revelation principle, I can think of the regulators problem in terms of a direct mechanism,
which is a triple of functions fq (; ) ; x (; ) ; t (; )g for all (; ) 2 H; that satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints. The regulator maximizes a weighted sum of net consumer surplus and
producer surplus. If a rm announces parameters ^ and ^; then its prots are given by


^; ; ^; 

 t

^; ^

  C

x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; ; 

:
Under a truthful mechanism, the weighted joint surplus for a given pair (; ) is equal to
W (; )  V 1 (x (; )) + V 2 (q (; ))  t (; ) + (; ; ; )
where  2 (0; 1) : Since  is kept constant throughout the paper, I suppress the dependence of the
welfare function on  in what follows: I let  and H denote the random variables with typical
realizations  and ; respectively, and let EH denote the expectation operator taken over the
random variables  and H: The regulator solves the following problem, which I denote as problem
P:
max
x(;);q(;);t(;)
EHW (; ) (1)
s.t. for all ;  and all ^; ^
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ^; 

; (2)
and for all ; 
(; ; ; )  0; (3)
(2) is the incentive compatibility condition, requiring that a rm of type ;  must have no incentive
to mimic any other type of rm;(3) requires that each rm in equilibrium obtain a non-negative
prot.
2.2 The rst-best
Since  < 1; the regulator allocates all surplus to the consumers in the rst-best allocation; the
participation constraint is binding for each type, (; ; ; ) = 0; so
t (; ) = C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; ; ) :
6See, e.g., La¤ont and Tirole [1993].
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Substituting for t (; ) into the regulators objective function, I obtain
max
x(;);q(;)
EH
 
V 1 (x (; )) + V 2 (q (; ))  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; ; ) :
The rst-best optimal policy for good one, xfb (; ) ; satises equality of marginal benets and
costs, so
V 1x
 
xfb (; )
  Cx  xfb (; ) ; qfb (; ) ; ;  = 0:
I assume throughout the paper that     is su¢ ciently large and  su¢ ciently small in the sense
of the following assumption:
Assumption 1: For all i and all x in the relevant range  + x  V 2(qi) V 2(qi 1)qi qi 1   + x:
Assumption 1 implies that, regardless of the quantity x; for a rm with a high cost parameter
; the increase in costs due to an increase in qi outweighs the increase in surplus, while for a rm
with cost parameter , the reverse is true. Hence, the rst-best policy entails qfb (; ) = q0 for all
 and qfb
 
; 

= qn:
3 Statement of the problem
3.1 Implementable allocations
To solve the regulators problem I begin by bringing the incentive and participation constraints,
(2) and (3) ; into a more tractable form. Obviously, the set of implementable allocations for good
one production depends on the implemented allocation for good two. However, Assumption 1 pins
down the optimal allocation for good two also in the second best, which is of course precisely the
reason to impose it in the rst place.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, a second-best allocation entails q (; ) = q0 and q
 
; 

= qn for
all :
If the cost di¤erences in the  dimension are large, the rst-best allocation rule for good two
production continues to be optimal also with asymmetric information. The reason is that surplus
is maximal for this allocation and at the same time incentive constraints are as relaxed as they can
be. Focussing on this case allows me to concentrate on the distortions relative to the case where
there is only one good that is to be produced in quantity x: By design, all the distortions occur in
the good one dimension.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, for the second-best optimal allocation rule for good two, q (; ) =
q0 and q
 
; 

= qn for all ; the incentive constraint (2) is equivalent to the pair of one-dimensional
constraints
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

(4)
and
(; ; ; )  (; ; ^; ) : (5)
The intuition for this result is very simple. A rms incentive to report its cost parameter
 do not depend on what the rm reported about its cost parameter ; and vice versa. To see
this, suppose a rm with cost parameters (; ) announces ^ 6= . Its prot di¤ers from the prot
of a rm with cost parameters (; ^) by the amount [q (; ^)  q (; )] : However, as long as the
functions q (; ^) and q (; ) are independent of ; the di¤erence in prots is an additive constant.
Hence, the rms optimal report in the  dimension is not a¤ected by its report in the  dimension.
Hence, the two-dimensional constraint breaks down into a pair of one-dimensional constraints.7
This insight allows me to state the incentive and participation constraints in a tractable manner.
Let  (; )  max^ 

^; ; ; 

:
Lemma 3 i) The incentive constraint (4) is satised if and only if
 (; ) = 
 
; 

+
Z

x (y; ) dy (6)
and x (; ) is non-increasing in  for all ;
ii) The incentive constraint (5) is satised if and only if
qn
 
       ;    (; )  q0      : (7)
iii) The participation constraints (3) are met if  (; )  0:
The proof of the Lemma is standard and therefore omitted8 . To prove part i) one applies
the well known envelope arguments to compute changes in the rms rents when  changes but
 is held constant. Therefore, the rent of a rm of type (; ) is equal to the sum of the rent of
the most ine¢ cient rm within rms with cost parameter ; 
 
; 

; and the marginal changes
of the rms rent with respect to changes in its cost parameter : Notice that (6) allows for the
7This is the crucial di¤erence to the multi-dimensional problems of Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet
and Choné (2003), where the reduction of incentive compatibility conditions is not possible.
8See, e.g., La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
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case where 
 
; 

> 0; so some high cost types may receive rents. Part ii) follows directly from
Lemma 2. In the proof of Lemma 2, I have shown that di¤erences in prots when mimicking a rm
with a di¤erent cost of producing good two are captured entirely by di¤erences in xed costs.
Condition (7) merely restates this nding. Finally, part iii) is obvious by the usual argument in
one-dimensional models implying that the single-crossing condition (in x and ) implies that the
participation constraint can only bind at one end. Condition (7) implies, that type
 
; 

will
automatically participate if type
 
; 

does and hence the result.
3.2 The control problem
I ease notation henceforth letting x ()  x (; ) and x ()  x  ;  ; and likewise for the rent
schedules  () and  () : Morover, I let      and      : Dene the virtual surplus
B (x; q; ; )  V 1 (x) + V 2 (q)  C (x; q; ; )  (1  )xF ( j )
f ( j ) :
For future reference, I also dene the excess rent of a type
 
; 

over a type (; ) as
 (; ; )   +
Z

x (y) dy     
Z

x (y) dy:
Using (6) to substitute out transfers from the regulators problem, and integrating by parts, I
obtain the following representation of the regulators problem, which, for future reference, I denote
as problem P
max
x();x();;
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

Z

B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d    (1  )
+(1  )
Z

B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d   (1  ) (1  )
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(8)
s:t:
 (; ; )  q0
 
    (9)
 (; ; )  qn
 
    ; and (10)
x () ; x () non-increasing in : (11)
  0 (12)
Problem Phas the following structure. If the monotonicity constraints on x () and x () are
nonbinding; the problem can be viewed as a control problem with two control variables, x () and
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x () ; and two state variables,  
Z

x (y) dy and  
Z

x (y) dy: Moreover, the state variables enter
the problem through inequality constraints. This is a relatively complex problem, but solution
techniques are available in the literature (see, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz (1981) or Seyerstad and
Sydsaeter (1999)). If the monotonicity constraints are binding for some ; the problem involves
second derivatives. This case becomes extremely di¢ cult to analyze. Therefore my approach is to
impose assumptions that guarantee that the monotonicity constraints are slack at the solution to
problem P.
The presence of the constraints (9) and (10) alters the problem substantially. However, the
conceptual di¤erence to the standard problem requires only one of these constraints being nontriv-
ially present. Therefore, to streamline the exposition, I assume that qn
 
    is su¢ ciently large.
This is consistent with Assumption 1 and guarantees that (10) is satised automatically. So, the
relevant constraint is (9) : Normalizing q0 = 0; this constraint simplies to  (; ; )  0:9
4 A benchmark
Before I dive into the main analysis of this problem, it is useful to look into a benchmark case where
all the constraints are automatically satised. Suppose I neglected all the constraints in problem
P. Clearly, it would then be optimal to extract all the rents from the least e¢ cient producers
within rms with the same parameter ; so  =  = 0: Moreover, the quantity schedules for good
one would be chosen to maximize virtual surplus, so these schedules would satisfy
V 1x
 
xy ()

=  + qn + (1  )
F
 

 
f
 

  (13)
and
V 1x
 
xy ()

=  + (1  ) F ( j )
f ( j ) : (14)
Direct inspection of these schedules reveals the following results:
9The formulation above reveals an interesting connection between the multidimensional model of screening and
models with type dependent participation constraints, as in the literature on countervailing incentives (Lewis and
Sappington [1989] and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1995]) and type dependent participation constraints in general
(Jullien [2000]). Formally, one solves a family of problems that are constrained by the between groups incentive
constraints, where rms are grouped or stratied along the observed choice of production of good two they make.
When concentrating on the menu o¤ered to rms making the same choice, the designer solves a mechanism design
problem with a type dependent constraint given by the menu o¤ered to the group of rms making the other choice.
In contrast to this literature, the type dependent constraint is endogenous in the present context, while the outside
option is exogenous in the literature on participation constraints.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that     is su¢ ciently large and that @@
F(j )
f(j ) ;
@
@
F (j )
f(j )  0. If   0
and F (j )f(j ) 
F(j )
f(j ) ; then the optimal quantity schedules for good one are given by (13) and (14) :
Within the class of rms with the same parameter ; all but the lowest cost rm produce less than
the rst-best amount; there is no rent for the highest cost producer, that is  =  = 0:
The point is that the unconstrained solution that would obtain if I neglected the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem happens to satisfy all the neglected constraints. Clearly, if such
an unconstrainedsolution is feasible, then it is also optimal.
Constraint (10) is satised whenever qn
 
    is su¢ ciently large, which I assume, consistently
with Assumption 1. To develop an intuition why the other two constraints are satised as well, it
is useful to begin with the case where  and  are statistically independent and the distribution
of  has a monotonic inverse reversed hazard rate. Firms with a low  parameter produce higher
amounts of good two. For  < 0 this reduces their marginal cost of producing good one, so rms
with low  parameter produce higher amounts of good one than their counterparts with high 
parameters do. In turn, higher amounts of production of good one create higher rents for rms.
Hence, a rm that has a cost advantage in the production of good two has every incentive to
announce this truthfully. The intuition is depicted graphically in gure 1:
Figure 1: The rent of a type
 
0; 

is given by the area aefd, which is - by monotonicity of the
allocation in  - larger than the area abcd, the rent of a type
 
0; 

:
A similar intuition underlies the case of statistical dependence. If F (j )f(j ) 
F(j )
f(j ) ; then 
conditional on  =  is said to be smaller than  conditional on  =  in the reversed hazard
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rate order.10 The reversed hazard rate measures for given  the relative importance the regulator
attaches to obtaining an e¢ cient quantity and to extracting rents from rms with costs lower than
; respectively. In turn, reversed hazard rate dominance in the sense of the proposition implies
that rent extraction is relatively more important for rms with high  parameters, so the optimum
features xy ()  xy () for any   0; again generating higher rents for rms with low parameter
:
In sum, truthfully revealing a low type  is in the rms interest because that increases the
rms rents. A high  rm has no incentive to mimic a low  rm because qn
 
    ; the cost of
this deviation, is too high. Hence, only the incentive constraints in the  dimension are binding
and the problem can be solved as a pair of one-dimensional problems. Replacing marginal utilities
by marginal prices, (13) and (14) pin down the marginal prices of good one.
4.1 The Agenda
Proposition 1 lists conditions under which the solution of a multidimensional problem can be
obtained using entirely one-dimensional methods; hence everything is exactly as in the one-
dimensional world. The agenda for the remainder of the paper is to drop these assumptions
in a controlled fashion. If  is strictly positive, then the marginal cost of producing good one is
increased for rms with parameter : Increases in marginal costs reduce the schedule xy () point-
wise and thus reduce rents of types with parameter : Hence, for  strictly positive, constraint (9)
must be binding for  = 0; unless the statistical e¤ect through the reversed inverse hazard rate
counteracts this e¤ect and is su¢ ciently large. Similarly, even if there are no direct interactions
in the cost function,  = 0; constraint (9) becomes binding for  = 0 due to statistical inference
when the distributions satisfy F (j )f(j ) <
F(j )
f(j ) for  > :
To isolate these e¤ects, I proceed as follows. I rst analyze the e¤ect of direct cost interac-
tions ( > 0), assuming away any interactions due to statistical inference, i.e. assuming that the
distribution of  is independent of : Secondly, I analyze the case where the only interaction is
statistical inference, thus assuming that  = 0 and that  conditional on  =  is strictly higher
than  conditional on  =  in the reversed hazard rate order. Finally, I discuss what can be said
about cases where there is both real interaction in the sense that  6= 0 and interaction due to
statistical inference.
10This implies that  conditional on  =  is smaller in the usual stochastic order  =  (that is, First Order
Stochastic Dominance) than  conditional on  =  (see Shaked and Shantikumar (2007)):
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Throughout this paper, I will maintain two important assumptions. Firstly, I maintain the
assumption that cost di¤erences in the production of good two are su¢ ciently large. If this as-
sumption is dropped, then the allocation for good two identied in Lemma 1 may no longer be
optimal. I study this case in companion work. Putting everything together would overload the
present paper. Secondly, I impose assumptions on the distribution of types that allow me to ne-
glect constraint (11) without loss of generality. Without such assumptions I would face problems
of bunching in the -dimension of my problem, and would face these problems already in the
benchmark case, where the problem reduces to one-dimensional subproblems. By assuming such
issues away, I can focus on bunching along the -dimension, which seems more novel.
5 Interactions between the dimensions
It is immediate that the rm with the highest cost in both dimensions must have no rent at the
optimum, that is  = 0: The reason is that reducing  relaxes constraint (9) and raises the
regulators objective. Hence, with a slight abuse of notation, I write the excess rent of a low  type
over his high  counterpart as
 (; )   +
Z

x (y) dy  
Z

x (y) dy: (15)
Consider a reduced version of the regulators problem, which for future reference is denoted
problem P:
max
x();x();
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

Z

B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d    (1  )
+(1  )
Z

B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(16)
s.t. for all 
 (; )  0: (17)
The problem is reduced in the sense that (11) and (10) are omitted from the problem. However,
as I have argued above, given that     is su¢ ciently large, omitting (10) is without further loss
of generality. Dropping (11) from the problem is justied under assumptions on the conditional
distributions of  given ; which I will make explicit as I go along.
Compared to the original problem, maximizing (16) under constraint (17) is relatively simple.
However, the problem remains quite nasty. The reason is that the costate variables of control
15
problems with inequality constraints on state variables can display jumps at points where constraint
(17) switches from being binding to being slack. Therefore, one needs an educated guess as to where
precisely the constraint is binding.
5.1 The nature of incentive spillover-e¤ects
The way the regulator resolves the traditional e¢ ciency versus rent extraction trade-o¤ within
groups of rms with the same cost parameter  impacts on these rmsincentive to mimic rms
with a di¤erent  parameter. This can be seen from a di¤erentiation of (17) with respect to : We
have  (; ) = x ()   x () : So, if x () > x () ; then increasing  marginally eases the rms
incentive to overstate ; if x () < x () ; then the reverse happens. Vice-versa, constraint (17) may
force the regulator to bunch rms with di¤erent  parameters but the same  parameter together.
In particular, if (17) is binding over an interval

0; 00

, then  (; ) = 0 over that interval and
hence x () = x () for all  2 0; 00 :
Suppose that the schedules xy () and xy () dened by (13) and (14) violate constraint (17)
by an amount y 
Z

xy (y) dy  
Z

xy (y) dy > 0: Then at the solution of problem P, constraint
(17) must necessarily be binding for some : If (17) were non-binding for all ; then xy () and
xy () would be optimal. However, this requires that the regulator leaves at least a rent y to all
rms with low costs of producing good two. However, setting   y cannot be optimal. Around
 = y; the marginal cost of increasing  is equal to   (1  ); a fraction of rms  has low
costs of producing good two and rents left to rms enter the regulators payo¤ function with a
weight of   (1  ) : On the other hand, the benet of increasing  around  = y is zero, as the
regulator is already unconstrained by condition (17) for  = y: Hence, at the optimum I must
have 0   < y:11
In the Appendix, I formulate the optimal control version of problem P. The following Lemma
follows immediately from the optimality conditions at the low end of the support:
Lemma 4 Suppose that the schedules xy () and xy () dened by (13) and (14) satisfy
i)
Z

xy (y) dy  
Z

xy (y) dy > 0:
If in addition either
ii) xy () < xy () for all ; or
iii) xy () < xy () and xy () crosses xy () exactly once, then
11This heuristic argument is made more formally in the proof of Proposition 2 below.
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at the solution to problem P, constraint (17) is binding at  = :
In particular, conditions i) and ii) are met if   0 and F (j )f(j ) 
F(j )
f(j ) for all ; and either
of these inequalities is strict; condition iii) is met for  > 0 but su¢ ciently close to zero and
@
@
F (j )
f(j ) >
@
@
F(j )
f(j ) for all :
The proof is a simple argument by contradiction. Let x () and x () denote the optimal
quantity schedules solving problem P. If constraint (17) were slack at  = ; then I could use the
transversality conditions of the problem to conclude that x () = xy () and x () = xy () for all
  0; where 0 is the smallest  where (17) is binding. If xy (), xy () satisfy condition i), then
there is indeed 0 such that (17) is binding at 0: Using conditions ii) and iii), it is easy to see that
we must have xy
 
0

< xy
 
0

:12 However, this implies that 
 
0; 

= xy
 
0
  xy  0 > 0 and
hence that  (; ) < 0 for  close to but smaller than 0: In fact, under conditions ii) or iii), we
have xy () < xy () for all  < 0 hence (17) would be violated for all  < 0.
Even though one needs to invoke optimal control theory to solve the problem, the intuition for
the structure of the solution can be grasped using simpler methods. Essentially, this is because on
intervals where constraint (17) is slack, the costate variables of my control problem are constants.
So, consider a candidate optimal pair of schedules such that (17) is binding at 1 and slack on a
set (1; 2] : The quantity schedules for good one then take the form
V 1x (x
 ()) =  + qn + (1  ) F ()
f ()
  
f ()
(18)
and
V 1x (x
 ()) =  + (1  ) F ()
f ()
+

(1  ) f () (19)
on the interval (1; 2] for some value   0: Obviously, the di¢ culty is that the value of  is not
known; it is only determined as part of the solution. Moreover, it is not clear a priori, whether at
the optimum there exists such an interval at all. Dene x (;) and x (;) by conditions (18)
and (19) for arbitrary, not just the optimal, value of   0:
Lemma 5 Suppose that x (;) and x (;) dened by (18) and (19) satisfy
x (;) = x (;) =) dx
 (;)
d
 dx
 (;)
d
; (20)
12Under condition ii) this is immediate. Under condition iii), note that
Z
0
xy (y) dy 
Z
0
xy (y) dy = 0: Since xy ()
crosses xy () exactly once, and xy



< xy



; this implies the conclusion.
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Figure 2: For schedules that satisfy (20) ; imposing (17) only at  is su¢ cient for (17) at all :
 (; ) is increasing in  if x (;) > x (;) and decreasing in  if x (;) < x (;) :
then at the solution to problem P, (17) is binding only at :
If x (;) and x (;) satisfy
x (;) = x (;) =) dx
 (;)
d
>
dx (;)
d
; (21)
then at the solution to problem P, constraint (17) is binding on a set

; 0

for some 0  :
To understand (20) ; suppose I take 1 =  and 2 = : Moreover, let  take a value such
that +
Z

x (y;) dy 
Z

x (y;) dy = 0: Under condition (20) ;  must be such that either i)
x (;) > x (;) for all  or that ii) x (;) > x (;) and the two schedules x (;) and
x (;) cross exactly once or ii) :13 The latter situation is depicted in gure 2.
Notice that (20) refers to properties of the endogenous solution schedules. So, the conditions in
the Lemma should be read the way that if the conditional distributions are such that the solution
schedules inherit property (20) ; then (17) is binding only at :
13The third situation, where x (;) < x (;) for all  would imply that  (; ) = x (;)  x (;) < 0
for all ; which would imply that  (; ) < 0 for  larger but close to :
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Figure 3: Under condition (21), it cannot be the case that (17) is binding over an interval, then
nonbinding over some interval and then binding again.
When condition (21) holds, then there cannot be two points 1; 2 such that constraint (17) is
binding at these points and slack in between. Letting  adjust to a value such that
2Z
1
x (y;) dy 
2Z
1
x (y;) dy = 0; it would have to be the case that the schedule x (;) crosses the schedule
x (;) exactly once from above. However, that would imply that  (1; ) = x
 (1;)  
x (1;) < 0; so (17) would be violated for  larger than but close to 1: The intuition is depicted
graphically in gure 3.
Note once again that the schedules x () and x () are endogenous, so I cannot make direct
assumptions on these schedules. However, Lemma 5 is nevertheless extremely useful, because it
makes my problem accessible to an educated guessing and verifyingsolution procedure, where I
search for conditions on the conditional distributions of  such that the solution schedules x ()
and x () endogenously inherit single-crossing conditions. Then, Lemma 5 allows me to pin down
the regions where constraint (17) is binding.
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6 The Optimal Allocation
I can now present the solution of my problem. The following section is organized along conditions
on the primitives that give rise to the cases stated in Lemma 5.
6.1 Strict net substitutes and independent types
In this section, I focus on the case where  > 0; so raising the amount of production of good two
raises the marginal cost of producing good one. To isolate the role of this net-substitutability, I
assume in this section that knowing  does not provide any additional information about  :
Assumption 2a: f ( j ) = f     = f () :
In addition to that, I impose:
Assumption 2b: f ()  0 and @@ 1 F ()f()  0:14
The purpose of Assumption 2 is twofold15 . First, it guarantees that the monotonicity constraints
(11) are automatically satised. Second, it guarantees that at the solution to problem P, (17)
binds only at  = :
With constraint (17) binding only at ; the solution is very easy to obtain. Formally, if (17) is
replaced by
 (; ) = 0; (22)
then the regulators problem no longer involves constraints on the state variables but turns into
an isoperimetric problem. Hence, the optimum can be found by simple pointwise maximization.
It is useful to split the maximization into two steps. In the rst step,  is taken as given and the
quantity schedules for good one production are chosen optimally against the given level of : In
the second step, I optimize over the choice of :
Let k () denote the multiplier attached to constraint (22) : For the isoperimetric problem,
k () is independent of : The shadow cost attached to the constraint is the smaller the higher is
: Moreover, let x (; k) and x (; k) denote the optimal schedules for given : The rst-order
14As is well known, distributions with logconcave densities have non-decreasing hazard rates. The restriction to
decreasing densities amounts obviously to a subset of these distributions. Examples include the uniform but many
more. As logconcave densities are unimodal, we can create a distribution that satises the restriction from any
distribution with a mode in the interior of the support by truncating the distribution to the part to the right of the
mode.
15Throughout the paper, distributions that satisfy both Assumptions 2a and 2b will be referred to as distributions
satisfying Assumption 2.
20
conditions for the optimal schedules are
V 1x (x
 (; k)) =  + qn + (1  ) F ()
f ()
  k ()
f ()
(23)
and
V 1x (x
 (; k)) =  + (1  ) F ()
f ()
+
k ()
(1  ) f () : (24)
The intuition for these expressions is straightforward. If I were to solve my problem simply as a
pair of independent regulation problems, then I would obtain conditions (23) and (24) with k = 0:
However, by the conditions in Lemma 4, these schedules violate constraint (22) : So, to satisfy the
constraint, x (; k) is adjusted downwards and x (; k) is adjusted upwards so as to increase the
rents of rms with low costs of producing good two relative to their counterparts with high costs
of producing good two.
Consider now the optimal choice of  and let   () denote the value of the regulators objective
as a function of : Invoking the envelope theorem, I have
  () = k ()   (1  ) :
The marginal benet of increasing  is that the regulator becomes less constrained when choosing
the production schedules x (; k) and x (; k) ; this is measured by the shadow cost k () : The
marginal cost of increasing  is the additional rents that are left to rms with cost parameter .
As k () is decreasing in ; the regulators problem is concave in ; so it is optimal to leave a
strictly positive rent to rms with a cost parameter  if and only if k (0) >  (1  ) : Moreover,
if  > 0; then we know that marginal benets and costs of increasing  must be equal at the
optimum, so the value of the multiplier in this case is k () =  (1  ) : Supposing for the sake
of the argument that  > 0; I can substitute this value into (23) and (24) ; I obtain the following
schedules xyy () and xyy () :
V 1x
 
xyy ()

=  + qn   (1  ) 1  F ()
f ()
(25)
and
V 1x
 
xyy ()

=  + (1  )

1  + F ()
f ()
: (26)
I can now characterize the solution to my problem.
Proposition 2 Suppose that   is su¢ ciently large to satisfy Assumption 1. Moreover, suppose
that  is strictly positive and the distribution of  satises Assumption 2. Then, the optimal sched-
ules of good one production are given by xyy () and xyy () (dened in (25) and (26) ; respectively)
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together with  > 0 if and only if
Z

xyy () d <
Z

xyy () d: Otherwise, the optimal schedules are
given by (23) and (24) together with  = 0; where k solves
Z

x (; k) d =
Z

x (; k) d:
In particular, for the uniform distribution,  > 0 if and only if (1  ) qn
 
    > (1  ) :
The proof of the Proposition simply consists in verifying that all the constraints are met and
that  > 0 under the said conditions.
It is easy to see that the constraints are all satised. Assumption 2 implies that that the
solution schedules (23) and (24) satisfy the single crossing condition (20) for any k   (1  ) ; so
imposing (22) rather than (17) is justied. Moreover, the schedules are monotonic, so they satisfy
constraint (11) : To understand the conditions for  > 0; consider the function
 (k) 
Z

(x (; k)  x (; k)) d:
I show in the appendix that  (k) is an increasing function of the multiplier, k: We know that
 (0) < 0; since otherwise the constraint would not be binding at all. k (0) is the value of k solving
 (k)jk=k(0) = 0: Since  (k) is increasing in k; we have k (0)   (1  ) if and only if
0 =  (k)jk=k(0)   (k)jk=(1 )
Substituting k =  (1  ) into the rst-order conditions we get the schedules (25) and (26) ; in
turn, substituting these schedules into  (k) ; we get the condition in the Proposition.
For the uniform distribution, the condition can be expressed completely in terms of parameters.
(23) and (24) simplify to
x () =
 
V 1x
 1
 + (1  ) (   )
    + qn  
k

1
   

and
x () =
 
V 1x
 1
 + (1  ) (   )
    +
k
1  
1
   

:
k (0) satises the condition qn   k(0) 1  =
k(0)
1 
1
  :
16 Hence, I have k (0) = (1  )qn
 
   
and so k (0)   (1  ) if and only if (1  ) qn
 
    > (1  ) :
Leaving a rent to type
 
; 

seems to be a natural, rather than a pathological outcome. These
conditions are easy to meet and consistent with the requirement that     be su¢ ciently large.
16To see this, observe that for any value of k (0) di¤erent from this one; I would have either x () > x () for all
 or x () < x () for all ; and both possibilities are inconsistent with condition (22) for  = 0:
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The intuition for the result is that increasing  allows the regulator to tailor the quantity schedules
x () and x () for good one better to the marginal costs of production for good one; these costs
are higher for types with low cost of producing good two, because they are asked to produce the
larger amount of good two. It is optimal to leave a rent to type
 
; 

if, all else equal, the weight
attached to rm prots becomes larger, if the fraction of rms with a low cost of producing good
two becomes smaller, and if the di¤erence in marginal costs of producing good one become larger.
The solution has some remarkable properties. Firstly, the production schedules are distorted
away from rst-best for the most e¢ cient producer. The least cost producer of good one is the
rm with cost parameters (; ) : Even though the rm with parameters
 
; 

has the lowest cost
parameters, this rm is asked to produce a higher amount of good two, and this raises its marginal
cost of producing good one. However, regardless of how the most e¢ cient rm is dened, we have
x (; k) > xfb () and x (; k) < xfb () :
Secondly, the direction of distortions away from the rst-best allocation di¤ers from the usual
features obtained in one-dimensional models. Whereas my model features downward distortions
if production schedules are designed when the regulator and the rm both know ; asymmetric
information about  causes upwards distortions in the production schedule for rms with cost
parameter  and downward distortions for rms with cost parameter : The downward distortions
for the latter group of rms is more pronounced than in the one-dimensional model. The upward
distortion in the production schedule for rms with cost parameter  is most pronounced if k
is as large as possible, that is if  > 0: In this case, xyy () reveals that, all but the highest
cost producer in this group produce more than the rst-best amount; the highest cost producer
in this group produces an e¢ cient amount. Note that, in order to induce consumers to buy an
amount xyy () ; the rm has to set prices below marginal cost. Formally, this can be seen noting
that V 1x (x) = P
1 (x) : So, this model can explain below-marginal-cost-pricing in the absence of
competition or demand complementarities.
6.2 Neutral goods and a¢ liated types: the case of complete bunching
In this section I focus on information based reasons for binding constraints in both dimensions. In
particular, I assume that  = 0; that is, the goods are neutral. Moreover, I impose:
Assumption 3:  and  are a¢ liated, i.e. @@
f(j )
f(j ) > 0:
The reason I assume a¢ liation17 is that it allows me to pin down the bunching region.
17A¢ liation is consistent with the reverse hazard rate order; more precisely, a¢ liation implies the reverse hazard
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Lemma 6 If  and  are a¢ liated, then the schedules x () and x () dened by 
V 1x (x ())     (1  )
F
 
j 
f
 
j 
!
f
 
j +  = 0 (27)
and 
V 1x (x ())     (1  )
F (j )
f (j )

(1  ) f (j )   = 0; (28)
satisfy (21) for any   0:
Given Lemmas 5 and 6, the optimum can be found among solution schedules that involve a
regime of bunching in the -dimension for values of  below some value 0 and a regime of separation
in the -dimension for values of  higher than 0: The point 0 is endogenously determined by the
optimal choice of the quantity schedules for good one and the level of :
To understand the trade-o¤s involved it is again useful to approach the problem sequentially.
I rst take as given any value of  2 0; y ; and solve for the optimal production schedules for
good one. In the second step I endogenize the choice of :
Lemma 7 For a given  2 0; y ; the optimal production schedules x (; k ()) and x (; k ())
are determined as follows:
for   0, the optimal schedules satisfy x (; ) = x (; ) = x () where x () satises
V 1x (x
 ()) =  + (1  ) F ()
f ()
: (29)
For  > 0, x (; k ()) satises (27) and x (; k ()) satises (28).
0 () and k () are jointly determined by the conditions
 +
Z
0
x (; k) d  
Z
0
x (; k) d = 0
and
x
 
0; k

= x
 
0; k

= x
 
0

:
The solution is depicted in gure 4.
There is bunching of di¤erent  types who have the same marginal cost parameter  at the low
end of the  support; at the high end there is separation of such types. Moroever, at the point
where the regime changes from bunching to separation of di¤erent  types, the solution schedules
switch continuously from one regime to the other. The idea to show this is the following. The e¤ect
rate order but is not implied by it. (See Shaked and Shantikumar (2007)).
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Figure 4: Raising  pushes the point 0 to the left; a higher  enables the regulator to separate
a larger portion of types.
of a marginal change of 0 on the value of the regulators payo¤ function should be zero around the
optimal value of the switch-point 0: This requires that, conditional on  = 0; the expected value
of the objective at 0 - where there is bunching - should be the same as the expected value of the
objective just after the switch point, that is at  = 0 + " for " positive but arbitrarily small. This
value matching condition essentially boils down to requiring continuity of the solution schedules.
Thus, 0 is the unique intersection of the schedules dened by (27), (28), and (29) and the value
of the multiplier, k () ; adjusts so that the rents of types
 
0; 

and
 
0; 

are exactly equal.
Consider now the optimal choice of : Figure 4 illustrates the trade-o¤ the regulator faces when
choosing : The higher is ; the larger is the separating region at the high end of the support.
So, at the cost of giving up rents to all types with a low parameter ; the regulator can solve
the e¢ ciency versus rent extraction trade-o¤ within groups of agents with the same parameter 
better.
The following Proposition completely describes the optimum. To rule out problems of bunching
in the  dimension, I assume that
Assumption 4: F ()f() is nondecreasing in :
Proposition 3 For  = 0;   su¢ ciently large, and under Assumptions 3 and 4, the optimum
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involves  = 0 and quantity schedules x () = x ()  x () where x () satises
V 1x (x
 ()) =  + (1  ) F ()
f ()
: (30)
There is complete bunching of types, that is the solution schedules become independent of 
altogether - except for the allocation of good two. The quantity schedule has the familiar features:
there is no distortion at the top, there is a downward distortion for all types with cost larger than
the minimum, and there is no rent at the bottom.
It is never optimal to leave rents to ine¢ cient producers among rms with low cost parameter
: Since  = 0; the only motive to o¤er two di¤erent schedules x () and x () to producers with
di¤erent cost of producing good two is to extract more rents from producers within each group. If
 is increased marginally, then the regulator can extract some more rents over a small additional
interval of types in the  dimension. However, the cost of this change outweighs the benets by
far, as the regulator leaves an addtional rent d to all producers with cost parameter :
7 Extensions and Conclusions
I have solved a regulation problem featuring two-dimensional asymmetric information about the
costs of production of two goods in some detail. The optimal allocation di¤ers markedly from its
one-dimensional counterpart, except in special cases. Most interestingly it can be optimal to dis-
tort production upwards instead of downwards. The rationale for this result is a trade-o¤ between
e¢ ciency and rent extraction that involves the second dimension of asymmetric information, and
this trade-o¤ feeds back into the e¢ ciency-rent extraction trade-o¤ in the rst dimension. More-
over, it can be optimal to leave rents to the most ine¢ cient producer among those with a low cost
of producing the second good. The rationale is again that increasing this rent allows the regulator
to better resolve the standard trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent-extraction within groups of
producers with the same cost of producing good two (but di¤erent and privately known costs of
producing good one).
The presentation in this paper is streamlined around cases that display interesting economic
ndings. However, the solution procedure readily extends to other cases that satisfy the condi-
tions in Lemma 5. In particular, one can rationalize allocations that feature separation at the
high end and bunching at the low end of the -range by allowing for the right kind of statistical
dependence. Likewise, the paper is focussed around cases where the most tempting deviations in
the -dimension relate to the incentive constraints of types with low costs of producing good two.
26
It is straightforward to analyze cases where the rms with high -parameter must be kept from
mimicking rms with a low -parameter. This is analytically straightforward and not performed
here for reasons of space.
It has been observed that bunching is a robust feature in the multidimensional problem. This
paper clearly agrees with that view; with a¢ liated types the solution displays complete bunching in
the added dimension. However, the appeal of the present approach is that the solution techniques
still remain manageable even though there is bunching, as long as there is no bunching in the -
dimension. This feature encourages further extensions, such as introducing richer trade-o¤s in the
good two allocation problem and enriching the type space further towards the double continuum
case. These extensions are pursued in ongoing work.
8 Appendix
8.1 Implementable Allocations
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a candidate optimal allocation. It is useful to organize the
incentive constraints any such candidate needs to fulll into categories. First, one-dimensional
deviations must be suboptimal; for all ;  it must be true that
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

for all ^ (31)
and
(; ; ; )  (; ; ^; ) for all ^: (32)
Moreover, two-dimensional deviations must be suboptimal too. Dene the setsi 

 : q
 
; 

= qi
	
and i  f : q (; ) = qig for i = 0; 1;    ; n: two-dimensional deviations are suboptimal for any
type with cost parameters
 
; 

if

 
; ; ; 
  ^; ; ;  for all ^:
The right-hand side of this condition can be rewritten as


^; ; ; 

= 

^; ; ; 

+ qi
 
    for ^ 2 i:
Likewise, two-dimensional deviations are suboptimal for any type with cost parameters (; ) if
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

for all ^:
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Again, the right-hand side of this condition can be rewritten as


^; ; ; 

= 

^; ; ; 

  qi
 
    for ^ 2 i:
So, any candidate optimal allocation fullls in addition the following sets of dimensional constraints.
For all
 
; 

and all i

 
; ; ; 
  ^; ; ; + qi      for ^ 2 i: (33)
and
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

  qi
 
    for ^ 2 i (34)
The proof consists in showing that, starting from an incentive compatible allocation for which
any of the sets j for j 6= 0 and k for k 6= n are non-empty, one can create a new, incentive
compatible allocation and increase surplus. Hence, the initial candidate allocation cannot be
optimal.
Suppose we adjust the allocation to q (; ) = q0 and q
 
; 

= qn for all : While doing this,
we adjust payments to keep the equilibrium prots 
 
; ; ; 

and (; ; ; ) unchanged for all
: Keeping the production of good one constant, the transfer to the rm with type
 
; 

, where
 2 k; needs to increase by
 
 + x
 
; 

(qn   qk) : Likewise, the transfer to a rm with type
(; ) can be decreased by the amount ( + x (; )) (qj   q0) for  2 j : By Assumption 1, both
changes result in an increase in surplus.
It remains to be shown that the new allocation satises all the incentive constraints. Notice
that


^; ; ; 

= 

^; ^; ; 

+

^   

x

^; 

:
Hence, the change of allocation does not a¤ect 

^; ; ; 

in any sense. Therefore, (31) continues
to hold after the change of allocation. Consider now (34) and (33) : After the change of allocation,
these constraints take the form

 
; ; ; 
  ^; ; ; + q0      for all ^
and
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

  qn
 
    for all ^:
Compared to (34) and (33) ; the right-hand side of these inequalities are reduced, so the old
incentive constraints imply the new ones.
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Finally, note that the incentive constraints in the  dimension alone are just a special case of
these two-dimensional ones. Since both 

^; ; ; 

and 

^; ; ; 

are (weakly) reduced for
any ^; this holds in particular true for ^ = :
Hence, if the initial allocation is incentive compatible, we can create a new allocation, by
adjusting good two production as claimed, and increase surplus.
Proof of Lemma 2. Clearly, (4) and (5) are necessary for (2) : So, I need to show that they
are su¢ cient as well.
Given that the regulator follows a good two allocation rule q (; ) = q0 and q
 
; 

= qn for
all ; the prot of a type (; ) rm mimicking a type

^; 

rm is equal to


^; ; ; 

= 

^; ; ; 

  qn
 
    : (35)
Since 

^; ; ; 

and 

^; ; ; 

di¤er only by an additive constant (which is independent of
^), we have
argmax
^


^; ; ; 

= argmax
^


^; ; ; 

:
By (4),  = argmax^ 

^; ; ; 

; so
(; ; ; )    ; ; ;  for all 
implies that for all 
(; ; ; )  

^; ; ; 

for all ^:
Likewise, the prot of a type
 
; 

from mimicking a type

^; 

is equal to


^; ; ; 

= 

^; ; ; 

+ q0
 
    (36)
so clearly again
argmax
^


^; ; ; 

= argmax
^


^; ; ; 

:
Again by (4),  = argmax^ 

^; ; ; 

; so

 
; ; ; 
    ; ; ;  for all 
implies that for all 

 
; ; ; 
  ^; ; ;  for all ^:
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Proof of Lemma 4. Let  = Pr

 = 

: The reduced problem where I neglect the
monotonicity constraints on x () and x () can be written as follows:
  () = max
x();x()
266666664

Z

B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d    (1  )
+(1  )
Z

B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d
377777775
s:t:  +
Z

x (y) dy  
Z

x (y) dy  0
Letting z   
Z

x (y) dy and z   
Z

x (y) dy I can note further that x = z and x = z:
I can view this as a control problem with Hamiltonian of the following form:
H = B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

 +B (x () ; q0; ; ) (1  ) f    
+x+ x+  (   (z   z))
Di¤erentiating with respect to state variables, I get the conditions of optimality
@H
@z
=  =  
@H
@z
=   =  ;
di¤erentiating with respect to the controls I get
@H
@x
=

V 1x (x ())     q0   (1  )
F ( j )
f ( j )

(1  ) f ( j ) +  = 0 (37)
@H
@x
=
 
V 1x (x ())     qn   (1  )
F
 

 
f
 

 
!
f
 

 +  = 0
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
   (z   z)  0;   0; and  (   (z   z)) = 0:
Since both z () and z () are free, the transversality conditions are
 () =  () = 0:
Finally, the costate variables are allowed to take jumps at points where the inequality state con-
straint switches from being active to slack.
If    (z ()  z ()) = 0 then

 
+
   () = 0
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and

 
+
   () =  0:
for some 0: If    (z ()  z ()) > 0; then 0 = 0:
If i 2
 
; 

is a point where the inequality state constraint switches from being binding to
slack or vice-versa then

 
+i
   (i) = i
and

 
+i
   (i) =  i
for some i: See Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1999) chapter 5 for a statement and proof of optimality
of these conditions.
Suppose that the state inequality constraint is slack at and continues to be slack on a set of
positive measure

; 0

implying that 0 = 0;  () = 0 and  () = 0 for all  2

; 0

: From
conditions (37) it is clear that  and  are continuously di¤erentiable in  whenever x and x are
continuously di¤erentiable in : Using the conditions of optimality for the state variables,  =  
and  = ; and the transversality conditions,I have for   0
 () =  () +
Z

d =  
Z

 () d = 0
and
 () =  () +
Z

 () d = 0:
Hence, for  2 ; 0 ; I have
V 1x (x ())     q0   (1  )
F ( j )
f ( j ) = 0
and
V 1x (x ())     qn   (1  )
F
 

 
f
 

  = 0:
These conditions are equivalent to (13) and (14) ; so these conditions would imply that x () = xy ()
and x () = xy () for   0:
The proof that  < y is made formally in the proof of Proposition 2 below. The argument in
the main text shows that the above conditions lead into a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5. Notice that
 () =   () for all :
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To see this, notice that at points where the controls are di¤erentiable, we have  =   () and
 =  () : At points where the state inequality constraint switches from being active to passive
or vice versa we have 
 
+i
   (i) =      +i    (i), or   +   () =      +   ()
if this point is :
Moreover, since  =   () and  =  () whenever, the controls are di¤erentiable, the costate
variabels are constants on any interval where the inequality state constraint is slack. Suppose
[1; 2] is such an interval. Then, I can write
 () = 
 
+1

for all  2 (1; 2)
and
 () =    +1  for all  2 (1; 2) ;
where  () is non-negative.
Inserting these values into the conditions of optimality for the control variables, 37, I have
V 1x (x
 ())     q0   (1  ) F ( j )
f ( j )

  
 
+1

(1  ) f ( j ) = 0
and  
V 1x (x
 ())     qn   (1  )
F
 

 
f
 

 
!
+

 
+1

f
 

  = 0:
In the remainder of the proof, I show that these schedules are consistent with constraint (17) if
they satisfy (20) : In this case we can take the state inequality constraint binding on the minimal
set : Moreover, I show that, when these schedules satisfy (21) ; then they are only consistent with
(17) if (17) binds on a single interval.
i) Suppose that the conditions of optimality satisfy (20) : Distinguish two cases, 2 <  and
2 = : If 2 < ; then (17) is binding at 2; so 
 
+1

adjusts such that.
2Z
1
x (y) dy  
2Z
1
x (y) dy = 0:
Given condition (20) ; this implies that x
 
+1

> x
 
+1

, x
 
 2

< x
 
 2

; and that the
schedules cross exactly once. In turn, since
 (; ) = x
 ()  x ()
this implies that  (; ) is increasing at +1 , reaches a maximum in the interior of (1; 2) and
decreases again towards  2 ; where  (; ) = 0 by denition. Hence, the constraint is met for all
 2 (1; 2) :
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Consider now the case where 2 = ; where 
 
; 

=   0: This case di¤ers from the former
one only if  > 0, so suppose this is the case. In this case, 
 
+1

is reduced to allow for a decit
2Z
1
x (y) dy  
2Z
1
x (y) dy =  : Reducing   +1  decreases x () pointwise and increases x ()
pointwise, so it weakly increases  (; ) pointwise. Since for any  2 (1; 2) ;
 (; ) =  (1; ) +
Z
1
y (y; ) dy;
this implies that  (; )  0 for all  2 (1; 2) :
ii) Suppose now that condition (21) holds, so x () = x () =) dx()d > dx()d : Then, the
schedules x () and x () can only satisfy condition
2Z
1
x (y) dy  
2Z
1
x (y) dy = 0
if x
 
+1

< x
 
+1

, x
 
 2

> x
 
 2

; and if the schedules cross exactly once. But then, I would
have

 
+1 ; 

= x
 
+1
  x  +1  < 0;
so (17) would be violated for some  2 (1; 2) : Hence, it is not possible that (17) is slack on the
interval (1; 2) and becomes binding at 2 again. So, under condition (21) ; constraint (17) is, if
at all, binding on an interval.
Proof of Proposition 2. The Lagrangian of the problem is
L = max
x();x();
266666664

Z

B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d    (1  )
+(1  )
Z

B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d
377777775
(38)
+k
0B@ Z

(x ()  x ()) d + 
1CA :
In this formulation, k is independent of : It is useful to solve this problem sequentially. In the rst
step, I take  as given and solve for the quantity schedules that are optimal against that value of :
In this step, the value of the multiplier depends on ; so I write k = k () : The quantity schedules
depend on  through the level of the multiplier, but I will simply write x (; k) and x (; k) to
keep notation compact.
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Step 1: For any given ; the problem is concave in x () and x () ; so by a standard su¢ ciency
theorem, the rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for an optimum. The pointwise
rst-order conditions with respect to the controls are
V 1x (x
 (; k))     qn   (1  ) F ()
f ()

f () + k () = 0
and 
V 1x (x
 (; k))     q0   (1  ) F ()
f ()

(1  ) f ()  k () = 0:
Step 2: Invoking the envelope theorem, the derivative of the objective with respect to  is
@L
@
=   (1  ) + k () ;
the second derivative with respect to  is
@2L
@2
=
dk ()
d
:
I now show that dk()d  0; implying that the objective is concave in :
Totally di¤erentiating the constraint
Z

(x (; k)  x (; k)) d +  = 0;
I obtain
dk ()
d
=   1
Z

(xk (; k)  xk (; k)) d
:
Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions for the controls totally, I obtain
dx (; k)
dk
=   1
V 1xx (x
 (; k))f ()
(39)
and
dx (; k)
dk ()
=
1
V 1xx (x
 (; k)) (1  ) f () ; (40)
so xk (; k) > 0 and x

k (; k) < 0; and thus
dk()
d  0:
Since the objective is concave in ; the rst-order condition is necessary and su¢ cient for an
optimum. I have either  = 0 and
k ()   (1  )
or  > 0 and
k () =  (1  ) :
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Notice that in either case we must have  < y since y > 0 and k
 
y

= 0: The former case
arises if and only if k (0)   (1  ) : We now determine whether or not this condition holds.
Consider the function
 (k) 
Z

(x (; k)  x (; k)) d:
We know that  (0) < 0; since otherwise the constraint would not be binding at all.  (k) is
increasing in k: k (0) is the value of k solving  (k)jk=k(0) = 0: Since  (k) is increasing in k; we
have k (0)   (1  ) if and only if
 (k)jk=k(0) = 0   (k)jk=(1 )
Substituting k =  (1  ) into the rst-order conditions we get the schedules
V 1x
 
xyy ()

=  + qn   (1  ) 1  F ()
f ()
and
V 1x
 
xyy ()

=  + q0 + (1  )

1  + F ()
f ()
:
Hence, we have k (0)   (1  ) if and only if
Z

xyy () d 
Z

xyy () d:
Finally, we need to check incentive compatibilty in the  and in the  dimension.
Consider rst incentive compatibility in the  dimension. The schedules (23) and (24) are
continuous; hence they are di¤erentiable everywhere and if they satisfy dx()d  0 and dx()d  0;
they are monotonic. Consider rst the schedule x () : From a total di¤erentiation of (23) ; I obtain
dx
d
=

1 + (1  ) @@ F ()f()

+ k
f()
f()2
V 1xx (x
 ())
: (41)
A total di¤erentiation of (24) gives
dx
d
=

1 + (1  ) @@ F ()f()

  k1  f()f()2
V 1xx (x
 ())
; (42)
Observe that f ()  0 implies that @@ F ()f()  0: Hence, the numerator on the right-hand side of
(42) is non-negative and thus dx

d  0: The numerator on the right-hand side of (41) is minimized
for k as large as possible. As shown above, the highest possible value of k is  (1  ) : Hence we
have 
1 + (1  ) @
@
F ()
f ()

+
k

f ()
f ()
2  1  (1  )
@
@
1  F ()
f ()
 0;
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where the rst inequality follows from subsituting k =  (1  ) and the second one follows from
@
@
1 F ()
f()  0:
Consider next incentive compatibility in the  dimension; we need to verify that the solution
schedules satisfy (20) : Clearly, f ()  0 implies that the numerator on the right-hand side of
(42) is at least as large as the numerator on the right-hand side of (41) : Hence, x () = x () =)
dx()
d  dx()d :
Proof of Lemma 6. I demonstrate that a¢ liation implies that (21) : Di¤erentiating (27)
and (28) I obtain
dx
d
=
(2  )  f( j)
f( j)

(1  ) F( j)
f( j)  

f( j)

V 1xx (x
 ())
and
dx
d
=
2    f( j)f( j)
h
(1  ) F ( j)f( j) + (1 )f( j)
i
V 1xx (x
 ())
:
Notice that at x () = x () ; the terms in brackets are equal to V 1x (x
 ())    = V 1x (x ())   ;
moreover, as the latter term in brackets is necessarily positive, the former one is positive too.
Hence, x () = x () =) dx()d > dx()d if and only if f( j)f( j) >
f( j)
f( j) ; which is precisely the
a¢ liation assumption.
Proof of Lemma 7. To ease notation in this proof, I suppress the dependence of the solution
schedules on :
Consider again the control problem spelled out in the proof of Lemma 4. The proof is organized
into three parts. In part i, I derive the solution for   0: In part ii, I derive the solution for
 > 0: In part iii, I show that the solution displays continuity at 0:
Part i: the solution for   0
I demonstrate that that for   0; the optimal schedule satises x () = x () = x () and
x () solves
V 1x (x
 ())     (1  ) F ()
f ()
= 0: (43)
To see this, I can use the conditions for  () and  () and the equations of motion for these
costate variables to get
 () =  () 
Z

 () d
and
 () =  () +
Z

 () d :
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Substituting back into (37)

V 1x (x ())     qn   (1  )
F ( j )
f ( j )

(1  ) f ( j ) =   () +
Z

 () d
 
V 1x (x ())     (1  )
F
 

 
f
 

 
!
f
 

  =   ()  Z

 () d
Note that x = x as  > 0 for   0: Adding the two conditions of optimality for the control
variables, and dividing by f () I get
V 1x (x
 ())     (1  ) F ()
f ()
=
  ()   ()
f ()
(44)
where I have used the fact that F
 

 + (1  )F ( j ) = F () :
To complete the argument I now argue that   ()   () = 0: Since x () = x () = x () for
  0; any solution of (44) for given   ()    () satises constraint (17) : Moreover,  () and
 () have no inuence on the value of the objective for  > 0; because the costate variables are
allowed to jump at points where the state variable constraint switches from binding to non-binding.
Moreover,  () and  () have no inuence on the location of the switching point 0 either. Hence,
at the optimum  () and  () must be such that, conditional on ; the expected value of the
objective is maximized. Hence,  () =   (), and I obtain the expression in the Proposition.
Part ii: the solution for  > 0
For  > 0;  () = 0; so that  () = k and  () = k for  > 0: A priori it is neither clear how
k relates to k; nor is it clear how the values of the costate variables relate to 
 
0

and 
 
0

:
That is, there may be jumps in the costate variables at 0:
I rst show that k + k = 0: To see this, consider a candidate pair of schedules that give rise
to a switch point 0: Clearly, for the subinterval

0; 

; constraint (17) is binding only at 0: But
then, choosing the optimal schedules x () and x () on the subinterval

0; 

is equivalent to the
isoperimetric problem (38) with 0 replacing : Hence, k  k =  k:
Part iii: Continuity at the switch-point
I can write the value of the objective as
 
 
0

=W 1
 
0

+W 2
 
0
   (1  ); (45)
where
W 1
 
0
   0Z

B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d + (1  ) 0Z

B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d
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and
W 2
 
0
   Z
0
B
 
x () ; qn; ; 

f
 

  d + (1  ) Z
0
B (x () ; q0; ; ) f ( j ) d
+k
0B@ + Z
0
x (y) dy  
Z
0
x (y) dy
1CA :
Clearly 0 must pass the following test: the value of the objective,  
 
0

; should not increase
through a small change in 0: Invoking the envelope theorem, the e¤ect of a marginal change in 0
is
 0
 
0

=W 10
 
0

+W 20
 
0

where
W 10
 
0
  B  x  0 ; qn; 0;  f  0   d + (1  )B  x  0 ; q0; 0;  f  0 j 
and
W 20
 
0

=  B  x  0 ; qn; 0;  f  0    (1  )B  x  0 ; q0; 0;  f  0 j  (46)
 k  x  0  x  0
Clearly, at the optimum I must haveW 10
 
0

+W 20
 
0

= 0; so the values of the objectives evaluated
at the bound 0 must match. One solution is clearly reached when x
 
0

= x
 
0

= x
 
0

: I now
show this solution is unique.
To make the dependence of x
 
0

and x
 
0

on k explicit, I write these schedules as x
 
0; k

=
x
 
0; k

; respectively. A total di¤erentiation of the integral constraint
 +
Z
0
x (y; k) dy  
Z
0
x (y; k) dy = 0
delivers
dk
d0
=
x
 
0; k
  x  0; k
Z
0
(xk (y; k)  xk (y; k)) dy
Recall from (39) and (40) in the proof of Proposition 2 that dxdk > 0 and
dx
dk < 0: Hence, the
denominator of the expression for dkd0 is positive. Hence, I have
dk
d0 < 0 for x
 
0; k

< x
 
0; k

and dkd0 > 0 for x
 
0; k

> x
 
0; k

: Thus k is minimized when 0 is such that x
 
0; k

= x
 
0; k

:
Again using (39) and (40) ; for any other value of 0, I will have x
 
0; k

> x
 
0; k

: However, it
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is easy to see that the values
x^  argmax
x
 
V 1 (x)   f  0 j   (1  )F  0 j 	
and
x^  argmax
x
 
V 1 (x)   f  0    (1  )F  0  	
satisfy x^  x^ due to a¢ liation. Hence, the sum of the terms in the rst line in (46) decreases by
an increase in k: Moreover,  k  x  0  x  0 becomes negative. Hence, there can be no other
solution.
Taken together these arguments imply the structure of the solution given in the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3. Complementing the proof of Lemma 7, I demonstrate that the
optimal value of  is zero.
It is easy to see that the derivative of (45) with respect to  is still given by
  () =   (1  ) + k; (47)
and the second derivative is still given by   = dkd whenever this is well dened: Letting x (; k)
and x (; k) denote the functions dened by (23) and (24) ; and using the fact that (17) is binding
at 0 (k) ; I have for any  > 0
dk
d
=
1
Z
0(k)
(xk (y; k)  xk (y; k) dy) dy
< 0;
where I have used the fact that e¤ects of k on 0 (k) exactly cancel out as x
 
0 (k) ; k

= x
 
0 (k) ; k

:
Hence, the optimum features  = 0 if k ()j=0   (1  ) and  > 0 if k ()j=0 >  (1  ) :
Due to Lemmas 5 and 6, for  = 0; constraint (17) is binding at ; by convexity of the bunching
region, the constraint is binding for all : Hence, when evaluating the derivative   () at  = 0; I
can use the fact that x
 


= x
 


= x () for  = 0: Hence, for  =  and  = 0; I can write (43)
in explicit form as  
V 1x
 
x
 

   f   = (1  ) (48)
From (24) ; k (0) satises
 
V 1x
 
x
 

   (1  ) f   j   (1  ) =   (1  ) + k (0) ;
Substituting from (48) ; we have
 
V 1x
 
x
 

   (1  ) f   j   (1  ) =    V 1x  x    f    
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and thus
  (0) =  
 
V 1x
 
x
 

  f     < 0:
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